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A Word on JohnE.C. Brierley
ProfessorJohn E.C. Brierley held a B.A.from Bishop's University, a B.C.L.
from McGill University, anda doctoratein law from the UniversitMde Paris.He was
appointedas a teachingfellow at the McGill University Faculty of Law in 1960. He
later became assistantprofessor (1964), associateprofessor (1968) andfull professor (1973). He taught Canadianand Quebec private law,focusing on civil law property, comparative law, andfoundations of Canadian law. He also served as dean of
the Faculty ofLawfrom 1974 until 1984, and as the acting director ofthe Instituteof
ComparativeLaw, McGill University, in 1994. He was named the Sir William Macdonald Professor of Law in 1979 and was the Wainwright Professor of Civil Law
from 1994 until 1999.
ProfessorBrierleywasfrequently invited as a speaker or a visiting professor to other lawfaculties, including the UniversitMde Montrial, University of Toronto, Dalhousie University, and the Institut de droit compard of the UniversitM de Paris
HI. Following his retirementfrom McGill University in 2000, he was named Emeritus
WainwrightProfessor of Civil Law. He passed away in 2001.
ProfessorBrierley wrote and co-authorednumerous articles and books in
both English andFrench, destinedfor publication in Canadaas well as internationally. Noteworthy co-authoredpublicationsinclude Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec PrivateLaw with Professor R.A. Macdonaldet al. (1993), Civil Code
1866-1980 - An Historicaland CriticalEdition with ProfessorP.-A. Crdpeau (1981),
Private Law Dictionary and Bilingual Lexicons with Professor R.P. Kouri et al.
(1991), Dictionnairede droitpriv et lexiques bilingues with ProfessorP.-A. Crdpeau
et al. (1991) and Major Legal Systems in the World Today. A ComparativeStudy of
Law with ProfessorRend David, contributingto the first (1968), second (1978), and
thirdeditions (1985). He was aprominentfigurein the disciplineofcomparative law
internationallyand the leading Canadianexpert on arbitration.
Professor Brierley received many awardsfor his accomplishments. In
1965, he obtained the Prix Robert Denneryfrom the Facult6 de droit, UniversitM de
Paris,and one ofhis articles won firstprize in the Concours de la Revue du Notariat
in 1992. He was named trustee for the Fondation Jean-CharlesBonenfant by the
Quebec NationalAssembly (1981-1988). He was also elected for a number of positions, namely as a member ofthe BoardofEditorsfor the American Journalof ComparativeLaw (1989), associate member of the InternationalAcademy of Comparative Law (1991), member of the InternationalAcademy of Estates and Trusts Law,
San Francisco(1992), and later member of its executive committee (1994-1999). He
was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada(Academy I) in 1995.
This public lecture on international arbitrationhas been established to
commemorate his life and work.

Un mot sur JohnE. C. Brierley
Le professeur John E.C. Brierley d6tenait un baccalaurbat des arts de Bishop's University, une licence en droit de l'Universit6 McGill, et un doctorat en droit
de l'Universit6de Paris.En 1960, ilfut nommd teachingfellow a la FacultM de droit
de l'Universit6 McGill. Il deviendra plus tard professeur adjoint (1964), professeur
agrig6 (1968) et professeur titulaire (1973). Il a enseignd le droitpriv6 canadien et
qudbicois, particulirementle droit des biens, le droitcompard et lesfondements du
droitcanadien. II a aussi 6t doyen de la FacultM de droitde 1974 ( 1984 et directeur
intirimairede l'Institut de droit compard de l'Universit6McGill en 1994. Ilfut nommi Sir William MacdonaldProfessor of Law en 1979; puis, de 1994 ( 1999, il a 6t
titulairede la chaire Wainwrighten droitcivil.
Le professeur Brierley a souvent 6t invit6 (I prononcer des confirences et
(I visiter desfacultis comme professeur invit6, notamment l'Universit6 de Montrial,
la University of Toronto, la Dalhousie University, et l'Institut de droit compard de
l'Universit6ParisHI. Suite (I sa retraite de l'Universit6McGill en 2000, ilfut nommd
titulaire&mritede la chaire Wainwright en droit civil. Il est dcidd en 2001.
LeprofesseurBrierley est l'auteurou le co-auteur d'un grandnombre d'ouvrages et d'articles,tant en anglaisqu'enfrangais,destinds au public canadienet au
public international. On remarquera,parmi les publications avec d'autresauteurs,
Quebec Civil Law: An Introductionto Quebec Private Law avec le professeur R.A.
Macdonald et al. (1993), Code Civil 1866-1980 - Une 6dition historique et critique
avec le professeur P.-A. Crdpeau (1981), PrivateLaw Dictionaryand BilingualLexicons avec le professeur R.P. Kouri et al. (1991), Dictionnairede droitpriv et lexiques
bilingues avec le professeur P.-A. Crdpeau et al. (1991), ainsi que Les grands systkmes de droit contemporains. Une approche comparative avec le professeur Rend
David, en contribuantd la premire (1968), la deuxidme (1978), et la troisikme 6dition (1985). Ilfut unefigure marquantede la disciplinedu droitcompard a traversle
monde et l'expert incontest6 de l'arbitrageau Canada.
De nombreuses institutions ont publiquement reconnu la contribution du
professeurBrierley. En 1965, il a obtenu le PrixRobert Dennery de la FacultMde droit
de l'Universit6 de Paris,et l'un de ses articles lui a valu le premier prix du Concours
de la Revue du Notariaten 1992. L'Assemble nationale du Qudbec l'a nommAfiduciaire de la Fondation Jean-CharlesBonenfant (1981-1988). Il a 6t 6lu (I plusieurs
postes, notamment comme membre du conseil de ridaction de l'American Journal
of ComparativeLaw (1989), membre associd de i'Acadimie internationalede droit
compard (1991), membre de l'InternationalAcademy ofEstates and Trusts Law, San
Francisco(1992) etplus tard membre de son exdcutfy(1994-1999). 1 a 6t 6lu fellow
de la Socitd Royale du Canada(Acadimie 1) en 1995.
Cette prestigieuse confirence sur l'arbitrage internationalfut instaurde
pour commimorer sa vie et son oeuvre.

International Arbitration - Between
Myth and Reality
- 9 th John E.C. Brierley Memorial LectureSusan Franck*

The first woman to deliver the John E.C. Brierley Memorial Lecture in November 2o16, Susan Franck explores common but flawed accounts of internationalarbitrationbased on
anecdotes and myths while encouraging the audience to pay more attention to scientificfacts. While acknowledging the challengesof living in a "post-factual"society, she argues
that internationalarbitration,whether commercial or investment-based, is caught within
a largergeo-political maelstrom which includes a backlash againstglobalization, the popularizationofpopulism, and a turn toward nationalism. Rather than permitting decisions
to be affected by an emotive torrentof intuitiveforces that facilitatedecisions based upon
fear or easily accepted cognitive narratives, she recommends proceeding based upon rationality, data analysis, and with an eye towards evidence-based reform. In an effort to
connect data and normative choices, ProfessorFranckexplores existing empiricalresearch
on internationalarbitration,with a focus on cognitive illusions and how intuitive decision-making impairs quality both decision-making and the implementation ofappropriate
reform of internationalarbitration.She ultimately challenges stakeholders to move past
ideologicaldebates in an effort tofind common ground in the valuation of vettedfacts and
rule of law values.

I. Prelude

It is a pleasure to be here at McGill delivering the John E.C. Brierley
Memorial Lecture.
During his time as a professor and dean at McGill, John Brierley was a prominent figure in the discipline of comparative law and
a leading Canadian expert on international arbitration who seamlessly
bridged divides between common and civil lawyers. In preparing for this
lecture, I had the good fortune of reading some of his scholarship, and
particularly enjoyed his article on Equity and Good Conscience in Canadian arbitration law.'
* Professor Susan Franck is a Professor at American University in Washington, D.C. and

an expert in international arbitration and economic law. She has made over 120 presentations and written over forty articles in leading journals. She was a scholar-in-residence
at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and has offered expert commentary to developing states, developed states, and organizations like the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation. Professor Franck is the immediate past Chair of the Academic
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Former lecturers include people who have either mentored me
or whom I have admired for years, including Yves Fortier, the late Andy
Lowenfeld, Jan Paulsson, Emmanuel Gaillard, George Bermann, and
Gary Born, amongst others.
It is therefore with great pleasure that I accepted the invitation
to give this lecture. I recognize that the honor is a great one, as I am the
first woman and, I believe, the youngest person to ever deliver this lecture. The honor is acute, particularly as you have at your own faculty one
of the most distinguished female arbitration scholars in the world-Professor Andrea Bjorklund. So I would like to give thanks to McGill and Professor Fabian G61inas for this invitation, and to Dean Robert Leckey for
his Twitter-based welcome last week. I hope these remarks will provide a
solid foundation for those who come after me.

II. Introduction
I speak to you, however, during uncertain times. Uncertain
times for the world, and uncertain times for the role that the rule of law,
international dispute settlement generally, and international arbitration
in particular will play in the future.
When I was drafting aspects of this speech in October 2016, I
decided to use this presentation as an opportunity to identify the risk of
creating international dispute settlement norms in an evidence-free vacuum. At present, there are forces encouraging reliance on intuitive decision-making instead of evidence-based decision-making, thereby fostering the creation of a post-factual world. After the recent U.S. elections, I
am afraid those concerns have not dissipated; rather, they have grown.
This makes my job today simultaneously simple and difficult. It
is simple because reliance on data and evidence is something that is intuitive for lawyers and should generate a degree of cognitive ease. This
in turn should make my presentation relatively easy for you to grasp and
accept. But it is also complex, as there are concepts that I wish to share
that do not come from the law. Rather, they come from science generally
and psychology in particular. Some of these considerations may require
you to test what you think you know in a way that is psychologically uncomfortable or will require you to acknowledge your own limitations.
The good news is that this difficulty confirms that we are all huCouncil of the Institute for Transnational Arbitration, an active member of the American
Society of International Law and a former member of the Executive Council, and an elected
member of the American Law Institute.
1 John E.C. Brierley, "Equity and Good and Amiable Composition in Canadian Arbitration
Law" (1991) 19 Can Bus LJ 461.
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man beings. I readily accept the limitations of the human condition,
which include my own errors. But much like Sisyphus pushing his
boulder for eternity, I am determined to make the effort to move the
dialogue forward because I know what happens if I step aside. The
rock will roll down the hill, and there will be negative downstream
consequences. So, in the spirit of Albert Camus and his famous essay,
I choose to imagine Sisyphus happy.2
What does this all have to do with the title of my talk today-"International Arbitration - Between Myth and Reality"? My
thesis is that international arbitration, whether commercial or investment-based, is currently caught within a larger geo-political maelstrom which includes a backlash against globalization, the popularization of populism, and a turn toward nationalism and isolationism
that rejects the reality of our globalized world. Rather than permit
our decisions to be affected by this emotive torrent of intuitive forces
that facilitate decisions based upon fear or easily accepted cognitive
narratives, we should recognize our emotional impulses but proceed
based upon rationality, data analysis, and with an eye towards establishing evidence-based reform of international dispute settlement. In
the words of Lin Manuel Miranda, we are "in the eye of the hurricane." It is now time to "write our way out" or-at a minimum-reason our way out with data to test assumptions.
Moving between myth and reality has everything to do with
evidence. Lawyers can and should love evidence, and international
arbitration is no exception. We have arbitration rules and soft law
protocols for dealing with the collection and assessment of evidence
before tribunals when adjudicating disputes. Facts matter-and they
can and should make a difference in the choices that we make. Yet we
now live in a post-factual society where evidence can easily be ignored
or discounted; where there is a focus on gut reactions and the use of
intuitively appealing choices-ones with real-world implications. The
zeitgeist is overpowering the facts.
To begin, I will provide three examples which may be fresh
in mind. They are certainly fresh in mine as I consider the future of
global economic integration and what it means for international arbitration.
First, there was the June 2016 Brexit vote, the bases for and
implications of which are complex and ongoing. Indeed, the data reAlbert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus" in the Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays,
translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1991) 119 at 123.
3 Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hurricane, HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (2015).
2
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veals the real economic cost of leaving the EU is non-trivial. The former
EU Trade Commissioner Lord Peter Mandelson recently estimated that the
costs of leaving the EU could be roughly 1.2 billion GPB per year.4 In whipping up the public to vote for Brexit and against economic integration, a
regular theme was a rejection of experts, the abandonment of economic evidence, and a focus upon intuitive decision-making.5 I am not alone in this
view. The Nobel-prize winning cognitive psychologist Daniel Kahneman
stated, "[t]he major impression one gets observing the [Brexit] debate is
that the reasons for exit are clearly emotional.. .The arguments look odd:
they look short-term and based upon irrationality and anger."6
The second example is the recent challenges to the Canadian-European Union Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) and the
more general debate about international investment law and dispute settlement. I see a discourse where a political subdivision of one country nearly
undid a trade deal years in the making-a trade deal whose future remains
uncertain primarily because of the desire to re-assert national sovereignty
and prevent international dispute resolution.?
There are undoubtedly challenges with striking the right balance among rights, remedies, and retained sovereignty in any international economic law treaty. It is vital to have a civil discourse about those
things that we believe are improper or constructive. Yet, since 2010, I have
slowly watched the discourse move toward emotive extremes-whether
it is a public exorcism of lawyers practicing international arbitration, or
commentators suggesting investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is a "legal
monster"8 that involves "profiting from injustice" since "agreeing to arbi4 Zlata Rodinova &Ashley Cowburn, "Brexit: UKbusinesses 'face an extra 1.2bnin costs ifitloses access to trade deals"' The Independent (14 November 2016), online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-latest-costs-trade-deals-access-uk-eu-a7415941.
html>. At the time of editing these remarks in June 2018, Airbus was exploring how to cease
core operations in the United Kingdom. Francis Elliott, "Airbus prepares to move from Britain
over Brexit Fears", The Times (22 June 2018), online:<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
airbus-prepares-to-move-business-from-britain-over-brexit-fears-f6jnc7x2j>.
5 Michael Deacon, "EU referendum: who needs experts when we've got Michael Gove?",
The Daily Telegraph (6 June 2016) at paras 6-7, online: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/o6/o6/eu-referendum-who-needs-experts-when-weve-got-michael-gove/>;
Henry Mance, "Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove", The FinancialTimes (3 June
2016), at para 1, online: <https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5dio8c>.
6 Ideas Desk, "This Brexit Comment Has the World's Attention", Time Magazine (24 June
2016), online: <http://time.com/438152o/brexit-lament/>.
7 The Canadian Press, "5 reasons Belgium's Walloons won't sign the Canada-EU trade pact", The
Toronto Star (24 October 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/10/24/
five-facts-about-belgiums-walloons-and-the-canada-eu-free-trade-deal.html>.
8 Mahnaz Malik, "The Legal Monster that lets Companies Sue Countries", The Guardian (4
November 2011), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nOv/04/bilateral-investment-treaties?>.; The Transnational Law Institute "Discover the Dark Side of
Investment" (27 June 2012), online: <https://www.tni.org/en/article/discover-dark-side-investment>; Corporate Europe Observatory, "A Response to the Critic of "Profiting From
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tration [means] states have accepted to be sued by the devil in hell."9
Some South Korean parliamentarians, meanwhile, have been involved
in physical altercations over arbitration policy.o ITA (or ISDS, as the
press calls it) has even become a popular Halloween costume with Politico reporters."
On one side, then, there has been the inflammation of public
mood, a cherry-picking of horror stories, and a focus on fear. On the
other, there has been a triumphalist narrative about institutional success. More often than not, there has been an inability to focus on legitimate critiques on both sides of the increasingly polarized debate.
Balanced data-driven analysis and cost-benefit assessment is rare. Even
a balanced analysis might be misconstrued as reactionary, rather than
balanced or progressive.
This means that reform efforts that are based upon data, and
thereby less emotively charged, are not necessarily at the forefront of
debate or policymaking. Indeed, in what was arguably unprecedented
"legal scrubbing", the investment arbitration provisions of CETA were
replaced wholesale with an international court proposal.12 This is not
to say that the normative reform was unmerited, but by moving quickly toward reform in a politically-charged environment, core data was
arguably overlooked. Requiring that all judges have public international law experience,3 for instance, ignores existing data suggesting that
Injustice" (4 January 2013), online: <https://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/ol/response-critics-profiting-injustice>;_George Monbiot, "This transatlantic trade deal is a
full-frontal assault on democracy", The Guardian (4 November 2013), online: <https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/o4/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assaulton-democracy>.
9 Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, "Profiting from injustice - How law firms, arbitrators and
financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom", CorporateEurope Observatory
and the TransnationalInstitute(November 2012), online: <https://corporateeurope.org/
sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf>.
10 Associated Press, "South Korea Passes U.S. Free-Trade Agreement, Lawmaker Sets Off
Tear Gas Canister in Protest" Fox News (22 November 2011), online: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/11/22/south-korea-passes-us-free-trade-agreement-lawmaker-sets-off-tear-gas-canister.html>.; Alison Ross, "Arbitration clause sparks protests in
Korea" (29 November 2011), online: Global Arbitration Review <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/103o808/arbitration-clause-sparks-protests-in-korea>.
11 Ryan Heath "Pics from POLITICO's Halloween Party", POLITICO Brussels Playbook
(2 November 2015), online: <https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/
politico-brussels-playbook-presented-by-alde-group-erdogans-big-win-brexit-turning-point/>.
12 Wolfgang Alschner "Legal scrubbing or renegotiation? A text-as-data analysis of how the
EU smuggled an investment court into its trade agreement with Canada" (24 March 2016),
Wolfgang Alschner (blog), online: <mappinginvestmenttreaties.com/blog/2016/o3/
legal%2oscrubbing-ceta/>.
13 European Commission, Press Release,"EU finalises proposal for investment protection
and Court System for TIIP" (12 November 2015), online: European Commission Trade
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those individuals with that type of requisite experience will likely be of a
narrow, non-diverse group. 4 This contrasts with what I anticipate was a
hoped for general expansion of the pool of adjudicators to include those
with expertise in public law and an appreciation of delicate balance of state
sovereignty.
As a third and final example, the recent U.S. elections demonstrate
that-while there were a variety of complex reasons to vote for Trump or
not vote for him-the United States electorate has put a man in power who
ran a campaign that, in core respects, has embraced anti-intellectualism
and the post-factual society. 5 This is a man who, among other things, put
an anti-globalization agenda at the forefront of his campaign. This is a man
whose Gettysburg address in October 2016 correctly cited the chapter and
verse of NAFTA 6 that will permit him to withdraw from the treaty; a man
who stated that on his first day in office he would announce his "intention
to renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from the deal"; and a man whose second priority is to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.1 This is
the same President-Elect that-as Lucy Reed noted in her Freshfields Lecture in London last month-has claimed that a US Federal Judge born and
raised in the USA was biased simply because his parents were originally
from Mexico, using this as a basis to disparage the court's legitimacy.8
policy and news archives <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1396>.
14 Susan D Franck, et al., "The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the "Invisible College" in International Arbitration" (2015) 53:3 Colum J Transnat'l L 429; Nienke Grossman, "Sex on the
Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts" (2012) 12:2 Chicago J Intl L 647; Shashank P Kumar &Cecily Rose, "A Study of Lawyers Appearing before the
International Court of Justice 1999-2012" (2014) 25:3 Eur J Intl L 893; see also Jos6 Augusto
Fontoura Costa, "Socio-Legal Aspects of Adjudication of International Economic Disputes"
(2011), 1:4 Ofiati Socio-Legal Series (1st) 3.

15 Timothy Egan, "Post-Truth Presidency", The New York Times (4 November 2016), online:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/o4/opinion/campaign-stops/the-post-truth-presidency.html?_r=o>; "Art of the lie", The Economist (io September 2016), online: <https://www.
economist.com/leaders/2016/og/1o/art-of-the-lie> ("Mr Trump is the leading exponent of
'post-truth' politics-a reliance on assertions that 'feel true' but have no basis in fact.").
16 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government ofMexico and the Government ofthe United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No
2 art 2205 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
17 Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Contractwith the American Voter, Oct. 22, 2016, Gettysburg, PA, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/CONTRACT FOR THE VOTER.pdf. After this
speech was drafted, Trump re-announced his intent to abandon TPP on his first day in office.
Ana Swanson, "Trump just announced he'd abandon the TPP on day one. This is what happens
next", The Washington Post (22 November 2016), online: <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2o16/11/22/trump-just-announced-hed-abandon-the-tpp-on-dayone-this-is-what-happens-next/?utm term=.9f184a6c8c97>; The American Presidency Project (APP), "A message from President-Elect Donald J. Trump" (21 November 2016), online:
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xX KaStFT8> at oo:oo:m:59s; After this
speech was made, Trump issued an Executive Order withdrawing the United States from the
TPP. C-SPAN, "Trump EO TPP Trump signs EO removing US from TPP" (24 January 2017),
online: C-SPAN <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4651802/trump-eo-tpp&start=24> at
ooh:oom:18s.
18 Alison Ross, "Reed condemns Trump approach to due process" (1 November 2016), online:
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Let us pause for a moment to think this through. If the President of
the United States believes that placing decisions in the hands of a life-tenured
judge from his own country cannot insulate an adjudicator from nationalistic or racial bias, why should he support international dispute settlement in
international courts and tribunals possessing diversity in nationality, race,
gender, and religion? This likely is not the end of international dispute settlement as we know it, but I anticipate that we are moving toward an era of
change, with a major world leader who appears to disregard data that conflicts with his worldview and appears to selectively consume evidence supporting his intuitive pre-determination without testing those assumptions.
This is the problem of a politics of intuition in a post-factual world:
when decision-making is left to our intuition, we tend to hear only what we
want to believe. The voices of other perspectives and contradictory facts are
drowned out, along with the capacity for critical analysis.19 Matters are made
worse-not better-by echo chambers created by 'Google Bubbles' or 'Facebook Fortresses', where technology gives us what we think we want to hear
and what is intuitively appealing, rather than what is correct. 20
This is where science can and must step in. Facts gathered in a cherry-picked or deceptive way can create the inaccurate impressions or be flatout wrong. This is why, today, if you leave with no other memory, it should
be that international arbitration can and must continue to strive to have an
evidence-based future. This is not merely about using evidence at trial or
how evidence affects dispute outcomes; it is about the promise of using evidence to guide the normative choices in shaping the future of international
arbitration.
International arbitration has always had a deep and rich tradition
of what political theorists, including those in the Frankfurt School of Critical
Theory, would call praxis-the blending of theory and practice in generating
a real-world impact. Theoretical debates about the meaning of kompentez-kompetenz21 and lex mercatoria22-to which Professor Brierley meanGlobal Arbitration Review <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1070112/reed-condemns-trump-approach-to-due-process>.
19 Andy Boynton & William Bole, "Three Potentially Fatal Words:'My Gut Says"', Forbes(16 June
2015), online <https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyboynton/2015/o6/16/three-potentially-fatal-words-my-gut-says/#64d6doo71153>
20 See, e.g. Farhad Manjoo, True Enough: Learning to Live in a Post-FactSociety (Hoboken,
N.J.: Wiley, 2008) at 198; see also Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding
From You, Lecture notes (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012) at 3, 8-g.
(exploring how website algorithms selectively guess what users which to see based upon previous user information, including platforms such as Google and Facebook).
21 George A. Bermann, "The "Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration" (2012)
37:1 Yale J Intl L 1; Ash Ashley Cook, "Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Varying Approaches and a Proposal for a Limited Form of Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz" (2014) 42:1 Pepp L Rev 17; Ben
H. Sheppard, Jr., "The Moth, the Light and the United States' Separability Doctrine" (2006)
23:5 J Intl Arb 479; Robert H. Smith, "Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?" (2002)
13 Am Rev Intl Arb 19.
22 See e.g. Gilles Cuniberti, "Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria" (2014) 52 Colum J Transnatl L
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ingfully contributed23-involve rich conversations about the meaning
of law in a transnational commercial culture, and thoughtful discourse
about the power of people (whether arbitrators or judges) to adjudicate
disputes. These dialogues cannot and should not stop, particularly as
international arbitration continues the tradition of blending theoretical
concepts into practical application. Dating back to Greek and Roman
law,24 international arbitration has historically been borne from practical reality-and in the knowledge that entities (whether people, corporations, or states) who trade and interact economically with each other
need some way to resolve their disputes so that all can experience the
joint gains of effective and efficient commerce.
Yet we can still do more, and it is only by collecting data properly-and by using and analyzing the evidence with respect for its limitations25-that we can assess conventional wisdom, thereby filtering out
myth and filtering in reality to make optimal decisions about the future
of international arbitration. In this post-factual era, we must work even
harder to ensure that there is a re-focusing upon facts, rather than political spin.

III. Practical Reality: Experience with the Data Void
This may sound high and lofty - or perhaps just abstract and
theoretical-so let me offer a personal example that demonstrates the
need, value, but also the deep challenges, of using evidence to inform the
future of international arbitration.
Early in my academic career, I attended a conference with panelists who were arbitration luminaries. One in particular spoke about
the increasing volume of investment treaty arbitration cases. It is important to remember that, not that long ago, one could count the num369; Bruce L. Benson, "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law" (1989) 55 S Econ
J 644.
23 Brierley, supra note 1.
24 See e.g. Randall Lesaffer, "Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law:
Occupation and Acquisitve Prescription" (2005) 16 Eur J Intl L 25; Henry S. Fraser, "A
Sketch of the History of International Arbitration" (1926) 11 Cornell L Q 179, at 179, 185go; Sabra A. Jones, "Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States"(1928) 12 Minn L Rev 240 at 242-43.
25

The author has written separately about the promise and peril of using empirical data to
inform decision-making, the standards for conducting quality scientific research, and the
appropriate application of empirical insights in international arbitration. See e.g. Susan
D Franck, "The Promise and Peril of Empiricism and International Investment Law Disputes" in CAMBRIDGE COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
(Andrea Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari &Stefan Krdll eds. forthcoming 2018).
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ber of investment treaty disputes on two hands; this was now starting to
shift, and more hands were required to speak holistically about investment
treaty arbitration. Yet, how the speaker ultimately described the landscape
of arbitration awards was contradictory to my own most recent practice of
arbitrating cases in London.
Science, however, taught me to be careful about discounting information merely because it differed from my experience. It also taught me to
be aware of case selection effects: namely that experience could be unusual
rather than representative. Cognitive psychology, which is informed by scientific research, also taught me lessons. First, I knew about the potential
for error from "recency" biases2 6 whereby one more easily calls the most
recently observed phenomena rather than recalling accurate and wholistic
memories. Second, I was cognizant of the risk of bias blind spots 2 7 and the
resulting need for caution, as there is a risk that I might be unaware of my
own blind spots. Armed with these tools, I wondered about which information was most accurate and representative. The tools of science and cognitive psychology helped me remember that people can have pure motives and
nevertheless be tricked by cognitive impulses that inadvertently fool us into
believing things that are untrue, inaccurate, or unrepresentative.
Cognitive illusions can be adaptive. Often, when things feel correct, they are. Indeed, quick intuitive reactions such as the 'fight or flight'
response mean that we may live to fight another day. Yet our intuition can
also betray us, and our assessments can sometimes be wrong. Using what
Stephen Colbert would call "truthiness"28-relying upon what we feel to be
true, rather than what the facts will support29-iS problematic. Things that
feel true, while not necessarily being accurate, create cognitive ease in human beings. This means that narratives that feel normal, that help us feel
confident, and that do not disrupt our world view are more likely to be be26 See e.g. Robert L Greene, "Sources of Recency Effects in Free Recall," (1986) Psychol Bull 221;
Dirk D Steiner & Jeffrey S Rain, "Immediate and Delayed Primacy and Recency Effects in Performance Evaluation", (1989) 74 J Applied Pscyhol 136.
27 David Dunning, Self-Insight: Roadblocks and Detours on the Path to Knowing Thyself (London: Psychology Press, 2005); Joyce Ehrlinger et al, "Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People's
Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others" (2005) 31 Personality & Soc Psychol Bull 68o;
Emily Pronin, "The Introspection Illusion" (2009) 41 Advances Experimental Soc Psychol 1.
28 See The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, "Post-Truth' Is Just A Rip-Off Of 'Truthiness' (18 November 2016), online: < http://bit.y/2fo31qt > at 5:26 (providing a 2005 definition of "truthi-

ness" as "the belief in what you feel to be true rather than what the facts will support"); Manjoo,
supranote 20 at 198 (discussing truthiness); Rick Hayes-Roth, TruthinessFever, How Lies and
PropagandaarePoisoning Us (St. Petersburg, FL: Booklocker.com, 2011) at 5-6.
29 The Oxford Dictionary'S 2016 word of the year also refers to this as "post-truth", namely "the
quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known
to be true. Tori Bolt, "'Post-Truth' is Oxford Dictionnaries' Word of the Year for 2016" NBC
News 2 (17 November 2016), online: < http://bit.y/2fhFtmp>; see also Caroline Framke, "2016
is the year of "post-truth," according to the Oxford Dictionaries", Vox (16 November 2016), Online: <http://bit.ly/2fOPUUl>.
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30
lieved and acted upon-even if they are flat out wrong.
This is why making certain choices-particularly choices likely
to have millions or billions of dollars of economic impact or implicate
state sovereignty-should not be rushed, ruled by intuition, or based upon
untested facts. Think about what it might mean for the future of commercial or treat-based arbitration. If we are making high-stakes decisions
based on what feels right and what is intuitively satisfying (but possibly
wrong)-and without (i) testing our theories systematically, (2) using
data to provide a baseline, and (3) considering the down-stream implications-consider the harm that we could be doing to international dispute
settlement.

IV. Turning International Arbitration Towards Psychology
International arbitration is not alone in being exposed to this
risk, and concerns about 'truthiness' are not new. Worries like this have
been part of the human condition for centuries. The impact of popular
opinion and intuitive influence has shaped law for some time.
In the Socratic Dialogue Crito, Socrates is in his prison cell
awaiting execution when his old friend Crito comes to rescue him. Socrates asks his friend to reject the populist pull of emotion, then poses
this provocative question: "in questions of justice and injustice, and of
the base and the honorable, and of good and evil ... ought we to follow the
opinion of the many and fear, or the opinion of the one man [or woman]
who understands these matters?"3' Socrates calls for a rational, rule-oflaw-oriented, and evidence-based approach, stating: "we must not think
so much of what the many will say of us; we must think of one the one
man who understands justice and injustice, and what truth herself will
say of us."32
Science generally, and psychology in particular, lets us test
conventional wisdom and separate myth from reality. Using scientific
methodology and data to inform our analysis, our conversations, and our
choices can aid the evolution of international arbitration. We can also
take comfort in knowing that using psychology is historically grounded
in international law. In the 1920s, Roscoe Pound observed a "functional
critique of international law" urging the incorporation of social psycholo30 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011);
Christopher Chabris &Daniel Simons, The Invisible Gorilla:How our IntuitionsDeceive Us
(New York: Harmony Books, 2010).
31 Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo: The Death Scene, translated by F.J. Church 2nd
ed by Robert D. Cumming, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Educational Publishin, 1988) at 56.
32 Ibid at 57.
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gy.33 Sir Geoffrey Butler likewise encouraged international law to explore
psychological perspectives34 Howard Lasswell, a political scientist and
social science legend,3s lead a collaboration with Myres McDougal and
Michael Reisman that served as a catalyst for the "New Haven School" of
international legal theory.36 Later, Soia Mentschikof tried to use then-current psychological insights to explore the behavior of international arbitrators.7
Yet the embrace of psychology was historic, and international
law has not yet caught up with modern science, and particularly cognitive
psychology. Cognitive psychology provides a promising prism for evaluating, understanding, and perhaps even improving decision-making. If
nothing else, it makes the process more-evidence based and thus more
legitimate. In particular, a core aspect of cognitive psychology involves
exploring how our brains can trick us and identifying deviations between
what decision-makers should do and what they actually do.
For the remainder of my time, I would like to endeavor to do this
in two ways. First, I will provide an overview of psychological concepts to
explore how cognition inadvertently facilitates our clinging to myths and
how testing our assumptions against data offers an antidote to truthiness.
Second, I will provide an overview of some pertinent research to aid the
evolution of international arbitration.

&

33 Anthony Anghie, James Crawford &John Bell, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 129.
34 Geoffrey Butler, "Sovereignty and the League of Nations"(1920) 1 Brit YB Intl 35 at 42.
35 See e.g. W. Michael Reisman et al, "The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction" (2007) 32
Yale J Intl L 575 at 575, n3; Harold Lasswell, Politics, Personalityand Social Science in the
Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor offHarold D. Lasswell, ed by Arnold Rogow (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1969).
36 See e.g. Harold Lasswell &Myres McDougal, Jurisprudencefor a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, vol i (New Haven: New Haven Press, 1992; Harold D. Lasswell
Myres S. McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional: Professional Training
in the Public Interest" (1943) 52 Yale LJ 203; Myres S. McDougal et al, "The Intelligence
Function of the World Public Order" in Myres S. McDougal &W. Michael Reisman, eds, InternationalLaw Essays:A Supplement to InternationalLaw in ContemporaryPerspective
(St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press, 1981) 287; W. Michael Reisman, "The View from the New
Haven School of International Law" (1992) 86 Am Soc Intl L Proc 118.
37 Soia Mentschikoff &Ernest A. Haggard, "Decision Making and Decision Consensus in Commercial Arbitration", in June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine, eds, Law, Justice and the Individual in Society: Psychological and Legal Issues Law Journal295 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977); see also Christopher Drahozal, "A Behavioral Analysis of Private
Judging" (2004) 67 Law &Contemp Probs 1o5 (exploring the theory of cognitive psychology
on arbitrators); Giacomo Elgueta, "Understanding Discovery in International Commercial
Arbitration Through Behavior Law and Economics: A Journey Inside the Minds of Parties
and Arbitrators" (2011) 16 Harv Negot L Rev 165.
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V. Exploring the Role of Cognitive Illusions on Decision-making and International Arbitration
In 1969, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky began researching how cognitive illusions affect expert decision-makers. They
found that even experts, including mathematicians and statisticians,
used intuition to make inaccurate assessments.3 8 They identified cognitive illusions-or quick, unconscious mental shortcuts that facilitate intuitive thinking (rather than slower, more deliberative assessments)-which created the risk of systematic deviations and error.
Their cognitive research also identified gaps between what we believe
rational decision-makers should do and how those individuals behaved
in reality.39
First, I will start with a cognitive illusion that is neutral but
demonstrative of a fundamental flaw in human decision-making: that
of availability. Availability involves a mental shortcut that relies on the
immediate examples that spring to mind when evaluating an issue. The
premise is if something can be easily recalled, it must be important-or
at least more important than other options. In Kahneman and Tversky's classic study on availability,40 participants were asked whether,
in the English language, it was more likely for the letter 'K' to be the
first or third letter in a word. Since they could more readily think of
words that began with K than words with K as their third letter, participants concluded that words beginning with K were more frequent.
However, a survey revealed that, numerically, the letter K occurs more
frequently in the third than first position.4' Similar results occurred in
experiments when participants were asked about other letters-name38 Daniel Kahneman &Amos Tversky, "Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness" (1972) 3 Cog Psychol 430 [hereinafter Subjective Probability];see also Daniel
Kahneman & Shane Frederick, "Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in
Intuitive Judgment," in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology ofIntuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 49

[Kahneman, "Representativeness Revisited".
39 See e.g. Cass Sunstein ed, Behavioral Law & Economics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Christine Jolls et al, "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics" (1998) So Stan L Rev 1471; Russell Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, "Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumptionfrom Law and Economics" (2000) 88
CalhfL Rev 1051; Jeffrey Rachlinski, "The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law
and Economics" [20111:5 U Ill L Rev 1675 at 1679-81; Cass Sunstein, "Behavioral Analysis of Law" (1997) 64 U Chicago L Rev 1175.
40 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability" (1973) 5 Cog Psychol 207.
41 Mark E. Mayzner & Mary E. Tresselt, "Tables of single-letter and Diagram Frequency
Counts for Various Word-Length and Letter-Position Combinations"(1965) 1 Psychol
Monograph Supplement 13.
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ly L, N, R and V-suggesting there was nothing special about a particular
letter. In all, the intuitive (but mistaken) belief that words beginning with
a letter were more numerous was tied to ease of recall. Correspondingly,
difficulty in recalling words with a letter in the third position was mentally translated into the mistaken belief that those words occurred less
frequently.42
Applying this cognitive illusion concept now to a different context-the public debate involving international arbitration-one can ask
how availability contributes, for instance, to discourse about arbitral
appointments. Prior to conducting my initial empirical research, I, like
many, believed there existed a very limited 'club' of arbitrators composed
of only the most famous who spring readily to mind due to their frequent
appearances at conferences, in academic publications, or in press stories
or award ceremonies. I presumed that they resolved most of the cases to
the exclusion of other arbitrators. I was thus surprised to find a breadth
and depth to the arbitrator pool, even prior to 2007, with over 145 different arbitrators appointed in treaty cases.43 Other empirical research has
also demonstrated that this number is growing, including Sergio Puig's
counting of 419 ICSID arbitrators in 2014.44 ICISD's recently published
data itself reveals that, in 2016 alone, it appointed 119 different arbitrators, which included 27 (or 23%) arbitrators who were first-time appointees. 4
However, data must keep things in perspective. While there is
a deep bench of potential arbitrators and evidence of a growing heterogeneity of the arbitrator pool, there are also many repeat appointments.
This phenomenon of repeat players is not exclusive to international arbitration. Cecily Rose and Shahank Kumar's study of the International
Court of Justice bar, for example, reveals that a small cadre of lawyers are
responsible for roughly 75% of all international cases-and those lawyers
tended to be men from developed states.46 Perhaps some international arNorbert Schwarz, et al, "Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability
Heuristic"(1991) 61 J Personality & Soc Psychol 195 at 195.
43 Susan Franck, "Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration" (2008)
82 NCL Rev 1 at 77.
44 Sergio Puig, "Social Capital in the Arbitration Marketplace" (2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 387
at 403; see also Daphna Kapeliuk, "The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision
Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators" (2010) 96:1 Cornell L Rev 47; Daphna Kapeliuk,
"Collegial Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition on Outcome in Investment
Arbitration" (2012) 31:2 Rev Lit 267.
45 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2016 Annual Report (2016)
at 7, 26, online: <icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Annual-Report.aspx>.
46 Kumar, supranote 14 at 902-906; see also Allain Pellet, "The Role of International Lawyer
in International Litigation" in Chanka Wickremaisnghe, ed, The InternationalLawyer as
Practitioner(London, UK: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2000)
at 147-48.
42
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bitration trends are not necessarily unusual, then, when examined within
the broader universe of public international law and international courts
and tribunals.
Cognitive illusions (like availability) may also be affecting discourse surrounding investment arbitration. Many disputes are recent or
controversial, and may be easy to recall. The ease of recall risks making
these cases feel more prominent within the overall population, as well as
representative of the larger whole. This means that despite the appearance of bias toward investors within these cases-which I would distinguish from the creation of substantive treaty rights that were designed by
states to only benefit investors but provide no reciprocal protections for
states-the myth about pro-investor bias in arbitration outcomes is not
borne out. My research has identified that states have won more than investors, and that the difference is now statistically meaningful.4? A recent
study conducted by the team at Pluricourts in Norway has thoughtfully
replicated aspects of this research. The draft analysis revealed that-although our unit of analysis and measurement systems are differentstates were winning in their research at a roughly 53% rate.48
Those studies do not necessarily differentiate among disputes to
parse the variance and permit isolation of the types of government conduct that are likely to create risk of liability. Thus, I am pleased to see
that researchers are starting to ask more sophisticated questions so that
we can get better data about how the system functions. Nathan Jensen
&Jeremy Caddell, for example, have begun exploring which branches of
government are likely to generate the risk of a treaty claim-finding that
most investment treaty disputes involved an alleged abuse by executive
branch officials.49 Likewise, Zoe Philips Williamso and Julie Maupin' have
independently worked to classify, in a more nuanced way, the type of regulatory activity triggering disputes. In a slightly different vein, Tomer
Brode and his team have started the rather challenging task of quantifying
47 Susan D Franck & Lindsey Wylie, "Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration"
(2015) 65:3 Duke LJ 459.
48 Daniel Behn, Tarald Laudal Berge & Malcolm Langford, "Poor States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration" Rev L &Economics, online:
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2978546 at 23-24>.
49 Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M Jensen, "Which host country government actors are most involved in disputes with foreign investors?", (28 April 2014) Colum FDI Persp 120 online:
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/lo/NO-120-Caddel-and-Jensen-FINAL-WEBSITEversion.pdf>.
So Zoe Phillips Williams, Risky Business or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor-State
Disputes? (Doctoral thesis, Hertie School of Governance, 2016), online: <opus4.kobv.de/
opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docld/2369>.
51 Julie A Maupin, "Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes" in Zachary
Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, &Jorge E Vifiuales, eds, The Foundations of International Investment Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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the definition of "state regulatory space,"152 to ensure that stakeholders
understand an otherwise nebulous term that has the capacity to become
an emotive political 'buzz phrase'.
My theory, ultimately, is this: cognitive illusions-including
availability-affect the debate about international arbitration. They possess the capacity to skew how stakeholders gather information, form
conclusions, and make decisions. Availability and perceived representativeness may lead people to presume that memorable experiences
are representative, even when they are not. Confirmation bias may encourage people to avoid information that tends to disrupt their beliefs.
Compounding these potential effects is the bias blind spot preventing
people from being aware of the impact and influence of cognitive illusions. Thus, together, cognitive illusions may create a 'perfect storm'
of misperception about international arbitration. Moreover, if intuitive
assessments are indeed affecting decision-making about international
arbitration reform, it may partially explain current polarization.
Data offers a de-biasing opportunity: to identify where facts are
correct, to test perceptions, and to aid the evaluation of normative choices. Focusing on balanced facts-rather than unrepresentative examples
or skewed models-facilitates conversations likely to remedy actual
problems, rather than improperly tailoring solutions that exacerbate
these existing difficulties.
But those are theories. As you might have gathered, I prefer
data. Perhaps this is why, in 2007, I began planning an experiment to
test how cognitive illusions affect international arbitration. My idea was
both to explore whether international arbitrators (like other experts)
are influenced by intuitive cognition and, where possible, compare their
decision-making skill to judges. To test this, I formed a research team
in 2012 to engage in one of the most unusual opportunities of my professional life. The organizers of the 2014 the International Council for
Commercial Arbitration (or ICCA) offered me unrestricted access to
conduct a live experiment to test arbitrator decision-making. The results
of this study are forthcoming in the Emory Law Journal.63

Tomer Broude, Yoram Z Haftel & Alexander Thompson, "Who Cares About Regulatory
Space in BITs? A Comparative International Approach" (2 May 2016) Hebrew U Jerusalem Leg Studies Research Paper Series (No 16-41), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2773686>.
53 Susan D Franck et al, "Inside the Arbitrator's Mind" (2017) 66:5 Emory LJ 1115.
52
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VI. Testing the Intuitive Override Model in International Arbitration
In doing the research, some my theories were confirmed and
others were found wanting. One was that international arbitrators,
like other experts, were not necessarily fully rational or fully intuitive
in their decision-making. Rather, like research on other experts and
national court judges has shown, I hypothesized that international arbitrators would use an intuitive-override model of decision-making
whereby some (but not all) would demonstrate the ability to move past
a snap-judgment and make a more considered and accurate analysis.64
To test this theory, we used the three item Cognitive Reflection Test (or
CRT) to assess whether international arbitrators had the ability to avoid
an intuitively appealing answer which would readily spring to mind but
would nevertheless be wrong.55
The CRT asks three questions. For each question, there is an
intuitive but incorrect answer, as well as a correct answer that is easy to
discern upon reflection. The first CRT question was:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.oo more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?" The intuitive response, lot, is mathematically incorrect. If the bat costs US$1 more than lot (US$1.1o) and the ball
is loo, the total cost is US$1.20. The correct answer is 50, with a bat cost56
ing US$1.o5 and a ball costing 50. The calculation is relatively easy, but
the analysis requires deliberation to avoid generating inadvertent error.

The second CRT question was:
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
ioo machines to make ioo widgets?"57 The intuitive answer is loo, but
this is wrong. Deliberation reveals that if five machines make five widgets
in five minutes, then each machine makes a single widget in five minutes,
which is called the "base rate." With that base rate, one can calculate it
8
takes five minutes for loo machines to make ioo widgets.5

54 See e.g. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, "Inside the Judicial
Mind" (2001) 86:4 Cornell L Rev 777; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J
Wistrich, "The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice" (2009) 58:7 Duke LJ 1477 [Guthrie et al, "Hidden Judiciary]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, "Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases",
(2007) 93:1 Cornell L Rev 1 [Gurthie et al, "Blinking"]; Kahneman, "Representativeness
Revisited", supra note 36 at 49-50.
55 See e.g. Shane Frederick, "Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making" (2005) 19:4 J Econ
Persp 25 [Frederick].
56 Ibid at 26-27.
57 Ibid at 26-27.
58 Guthrie et al, "Blinking", supra note 52 at io-11.
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The final CRT question asked:
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would
it take the patch to cover half of the lake?"59 The intuitive (and incorrect)
answer is 24 days. Using slower cognition to override snap judgments reveals the correct answer is 47 days. If the rate of growth means the amount
doubles every day, compounding means half the lake was covered the day
before (i.e. day 47, not day 48).

Now, if you were answering these questions in your head, I am sure that
you all got them correct. The more important question, however, is how
our subjects did, and how those international arbitrators compared to
judges.
The results were both surprising and unsurprising. The bottom
line was that no one did particularly well; not the judges, and not the
arbitrators. The only people who tended to excel were MIT students and
the St. Gallen Law and Economics students we did some beta-testing on
(although some of that credit may go to the economic teaching skills of
my co-author Anne van Aaken).
International arbitrators' average CRT score was 1.47, which
exceeds mean CRT scores of judges participating in prior studies. But
lest we make inferences that are unwarranted, I suggest a degree of caution. Every number you will see in empirical research contains some
variance-including my own. These 'standard deviations' provide the
degree of potential error, which means that for every number that looks
like it is a fixed value, there is inevitably a range of grey around the edges. Thus, simply because numbers look different on their face does not
mean that they are actually different in a meaningful way. As Ian Ayres
put it thoughtfully in his book Supercrunchers-wherehe told the story
of how his eight-year old daughter could understand the risk of error in
any number-"[t]here's a 95 percent chance that a normally distributed
variable will fall within two standard deviations (plus or minus) of its
mean."6o Put another way, the "Two Standard Deviation Rule" (or 2SD
Rule) means that every number is correct, plus or minus two standard
deviations from that number.
For our purposes, the 2SD Rule means that international arbitrators must not get overly excited about their numerical outperformance of some judges. Ultimately, it was not statistically possible to
conclude that arbitrators reliably outperformed US domestic administrative law judges. While it was possible to conclude that internation59 Frederick, supranote 53 at 27, 37.
6o Ian Ayres, Super Crunchers:How Anything can be Predicted(London, UK: John Murray, 2008) at 212-14.
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al arbitrators reliably outperformed Florida state judges, I must
provide three independent cautions. First, it remains unclear how
representative Florida state court judges are compared to judges in
other jurisdictions. Thus, the findings do not mean that international arbitrators are superior to all types of judges. Second, the two sets
of adjudicators were tested at different points in time, and the temporal lapse could be an intervening variable disrupting the value of
direct comparison. Third, and more importantly, to the extent that
there was a statistically meaningful difference with one set of judges, the effect size was statistically small. To use an analogy I give
my students, a small effect size means there is a difference, but it
may not be of practical importance: Mahnolo Blanik and Christian
Louboutin are two different types of shoes, but both are high-end
designers with impeccable style.
The capacity of international arbitrators to deploy an intuitive-override model within the context of actual adjudicationis
also potentially different than within the context of the CRT. To test
this possibility, we experimented with other cognitive illusions by
giving arbitrators a series of disputes to resolve that more closely
mirror real disputes. The two illusions that I would like to focus on
for the remainder of my time are anchoring and framing.

VII. Exploring Anchoring in International Arbitration
Anchoring is a form of intuitive decision making involving
numerical estimates. When people make estimates, they tend to rely
upon an initial numerical value that is readily available, which then
'anchors' subsequent numerical estimations.
This can happen even where the initial figure is irrelevant.
Kahneman & Tversky's 'wheel-of-fortune' experiment demonstrated the impact of irrelevant anchors on estimates.6 ' In that study, a
wheel of fortune generated a random number, and subjects were
then asked to estimate the percentage of African states in the United
Nations. Responses were biased toward the value derived from the
wheel-of-fortune, even though that number had nothing to do with
reality.
Anchors are pervasive and difficult to dislodge, even with
61 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases" (1974) 185:4157 Science 1124.
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subsequently acquired information. 62 For this reason, getting your
anchor right the first time-and having it be relevant and non-deceptive-is fundamental. In our study, one thing we identified is
that irrelevant anchors sometimes affected damage awards. This
was discernable because the only thing that we manipulated was
the value of a wholly irrelevant anchor that involved an independent
dispute in a different country under a different applicable law. Even
though the anchor had nothing to do with the merits of the case,
it nonetheless influenced damage assessments when the irrelevant
anchor was of a sufficiently high value-say US$50 to US$300 million. In international arbitration, arbitrators appeared to discount
anchors of US$1 million, suggesting that international arbitration
maybe insensitive to the influence of lower awards. But these results
also demonstrated that-once again-international arbitrators were
not dissimilar to their judicial counterparts who were also affected
by the pernicious influence of irrelevant damage assessments. 63
This brings me to relevant anchors. Anchors that are relevant - closely connected to law and facts-can be adaptive and helpful to adjudication. One of the best examples of a relevant anchor
(whether in litigation or arbitration) is an expert report. A common
myth in international arbitration is that arbitrators fail to adhere
to rule of law norms 6 4 when they opt to "split the baby" and render
62 Jennifer K Robbennolt &Jean R Sternlight, Psychologyfor Lawyers: Understanding Human Factors in Negotiation, Litigation, and Decision Making (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2012) at 72; Gretchen B Chapman & Eric J Johnson, "Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value" in Intuitive
Judgment, supra note 36 at 125-26; Fritz Stack & Thomas Mussweiler, "Heuristic
Strategies for Estimation Under Uncertainty: The Enigmatic Case of Anchoring" in
Foundation of Social Cognition (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003) at 79-81.
63 Guthrie et al, "Hidden Judiciary", supra note 52 at 1502-04.
64 See e.g. William W Park, "Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies"
in Law and Practice (2006) at 56o (describing bankers' "herd mentality" and suggesting arbitration in an "unnecessary invitation" to render "split the difference"
awards); Douglas Shontz, Fred Kipperman & Vanessa Soma, Business-to-Business
Arbitrationin the United States: Perceptions of CorporateCounsel, Rand Institute
for Civil Justice (Santa Monica, CA: Rand corporation,2011), online: https://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical reports/2011/RANDTR781.pdf
at
x; 11-13 (identifying that parties' "overwhelmingly believe that arbitrators tend to
'split the baby' with their rulings-that is, they are unwilling to rule strongly for one
party"); Richard A. Posner, "Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach", (2005) 32 Fl St L Rev 1259 at 1261 ("We can expect, therefore, a tendency
for arbitrators to 'split the difference' in their awards"); but see Christopher Drahozal, "Busting Arbitration Myths", (2008) 56:3 U Kan L Rev 663 at 665, 6 73-77
(identifying the "split the baby" myth of arbitration but providing contradictory em-
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compromise damage awards that fall midway between parties' damage assessments. There are also related concerns about who appointed the arbitrator, and that arbitrators may have "an incentive to render compromised
judgments that do not badly offend either party." 65
To separate the myth from reality, we gave arbitrators a brief
vignette about a beach front property, where a government indirectly expropriated the land to support legitimate local ecological objectives. We
explained the financial bases of the divergent expert reports, which used
relevant underlying data and credible models to assess valuation. We then
instructed the arbitrators on the applicable law. In all versions, the respondent asserted the land value was US$1 million. In the low anchor condition,
the developer claimed damages of US$10 million, and in the high anchor
condition the developer claimed US$50 million. The relevant anchors did
affect amounts awarded, and the property owner's expert's claim always
set an upper limit for compensation. There were also few arbitrators that
awarded less than what the respondent conceded was due. The nature of
the hypothetical thus permitted us to test the "split the baby hypothesis" in
both anchoring conditions.
What we found was that, irrespective of the experimental condition, arbitrators awarded damages in a similar fashion. Damage awards-in
both conditions-might have appeared to support a "baby splitting" theory,
as average awards and proportions were roughly in the middle of the two
expert valuations. But those blunt numbers hid the reality of the matter.
Peeking under the rocks demonstrated that the story is much more complicated. There was in fact real variance in how international arbitrators
decided cases. The data revealed three groups with different propensitiesnot one bunch of baby-splitters. One group tended to validate the claimant,
awarding ioo% of requested damages. As that group was big with little dispersion, they were: (a) easy to identify, and (b) memorable. A second group
were akin to "baby splitters", but only two subjects actually provided a pure
50/50 split. The third group was more pro-respondent, but their awards
were relatively dispersed-making them easier to miss as a group.
These experimental results should not at all be surprising. They
mirror outcomes in real arbitration cases. 6 6 For example, research into
pirical) [Drahozal].
65 Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, "Globalizing Commercial Litigation" (2008) 94:1 Cornell L Rev 1 at 34; see also Kapeliuk, "Repeat Appointment", supra note 42 at 49, n 4, 54, 8789 (identify the "split the baby myth" but finding that awards rendered by elite arbitrators are
less likely to "split the difference" more likely to provide "all or nothing" outcomes or balanced
decision-making over time).
66 See e.g. Franck & Wylie, supra note 45 at 495 (observing that, for successful claims, there
tends to be a more pro-respondent outcome of damages awarded with measures of central
tendency around 27-35%); Kapeliuk, "Repeat Appointment", supra note 42 at 54, 81 (describing how "arbitration tribunals involving elite arbitrators do not have a tendency to render
compromise awards.").
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commercial arbitration awards by Christopher Drahozal, 67 as well as
Stephanie Keer and Richard Naimark, 6 8 shows that what can appear to be
a 50/50 compromise (if one only focuses on raw means) could conceal the
fact that arbitrators actually tend to make decisions at either end of the
spectrum. Compromise awards are actually the exception, rather than the
rule.69
To say the least, then, it is sad and disappointing that, despite
experimental and archival data from real cases, the public seems ambivalent and predisposed to believe a critique of international arbitration that
is emotionally appealing but factually flawed. Public discourse should, at
the very least, concede that there is variance in arbitrator propensity to
decide cases in certain ways.
VIII. Cognitive Framing in InternationalArbitration
I promised one more cognitive illusion, and this will be the framing of disputes. The framing of outcomes as a win or a loss can influence
how people make decisions.7o Natural asymmetries between parties in
transactions-be they buyers or sellers, claimants or respondents, or other parties involved in disputes-make this an area ripe for testing.
At the ICCA, we tested framing in multiple ways. We found that
framing the dispute as a loss or a gain affected the assessments of international arbitrators in multiple contexts. Arbitrators, however, are not the
only expert decision-makers susceptible to this cognitive illusion. Rather,
they are part of an illustrious group that includes golf pros, physicians,
and judges.?
The hypothetical I will focus on here asked arbitrators about
rescinding a contract based upon mutual mistake. In one version of the
vignette, the parties to a concession contract thought they were contracting for a gold mine when, in reality, it was for fool's gold. In another con-

&

67 Drahozal, supra note 62 at 675-676.
68 Stephanie E Keer & Richard W Naimark, "Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby": Empirical
Evidence from International Business Arbitrations", (2008) 18:5 J Intl Arb at 573-75.
69 See e.g. American Arbitration Association, "Splitting the Baby: A New AAA Study" (9 March
2007), online: <http://bit.y/2fFwizK>; Carter Greenbaum, "Putting the Baby to Rest: Dispelling a Common Arbitration Myth" (2015) 26:1 Am Rev Intl Arb loi at loi, 121.
70 See e.g. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk" (1979) 47:2 Econometrica 263; Daniel Kahneman &Amos Tversky, "The Framing
of Decisions and Psychology of Choice" (1981) 211:4481 Science 453; Daniel Kahneman
Amos Tversky, "Choices, Values and Frames" (1984) 39:4 Am Psychologist 341.
71 See Guthrie et al, Judicial Mind, supra note 52 at 796-97 (framing affects judges); Barbara J. McNeil et al, "On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies" (1982)
306:21 New Eng J Med. 1259 at 1262 (framing affects physicians); Devon Pope & Maurice
Schweitzer, "Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes" (2011) 101:1 Am Econ Rev 129 at 155 (framing affects professional
golfers).
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dition, the parties thought they made a concession contract involving
mineral extraction for fool's gold when, due to the survey mistake of
an independent expert, it turned out to be a gold mine. We told the
arbitrators the applicable law was that a contract "is voidable when 'a
mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the
agreed exchange of promises."' The applicable law meant that, because
both parties in both scenarios mistook the nature of the contract due to
the error of a third-party, the contract should have been voided.
What we found was a reliable effect, albeit a small one. When
the seller of the mineral rights attempted to rescind, there was a slight
preference to enforce the contract and hold the seller to its bargainenforcing the contract, and ignoring the law (i.e. a gain). By contrast,
when the buyer tried to rescind, there was a slight preference for rescission, letting the buyer walk away, and following the loss (i.e. a loss).
One variation in this hypothetical might be of interest. Although it is not a cognitive illusion in the psychological literature, the
'Fool's Gold' hypothetical gave us a chance to explore a framing-like
aspect of arbitration; namely, the role of party outcome on appointment conditions. We randomly assigned every arbitrator to one of
three appointment conditions and told them that they were appointed
by either the claimant, the respondent, or a neutral institution. What
we found truly surprised me. Given the debate within the literature
about arbitral appointment, I would have expected that, when arbitrators were told they were appointed by the party, they would have had
an intuitive pre-disposition to find in favor of the party who made the
appointment. That was not what we found. Rather, irrespective of appointment condition, roughly 90% of the arbitrators properly applied
the law and rescinded the contract. It was not possible to identify a
reliable link between appointment type and resolution of the contract
dispute.
I must caution you, however, that this was a null-result,
meaning that we could not conclude that the effect is absent. It is possible that the effect was present and that we simply needed a larger
sample (in this case, we would have needed several hundred more arbitrators for a confirmation). It is also possible that the experimental
methodology had insufficient external validity for failing to sufficiently
approximate the real world, and/or provide exposure to partisan arguments over extended periods of time in a three-member tribunal.
Nevertheless, I was intrigued to see that, when the law was clear, the
baseline that we appeared to have found is that most arbitrators appeared inclined to follow the law, when the law was clear and was pre-

26

Vol 5 (2018-2019)

International Arbitration - Between
Myth and Reality

cisely put the arbitrators, and the influence of party appointment
was arguably constrained.
However, I want to contrast these findings with research
different from my own. It produced different results, but does not
necessarily create an inconsistent picture. Rather, together, these
experiments demonstrate the challenge in providing a nuanced
understanding of arbitral decision-making. By this I am referring
to recent experimental research by Sergio Puig (and his co-author
Anton Strezhnev), who also explored the influence of appointment
effects.72 Puig's subjects were similar to the ICCA participants on
core fundamentals, namely: (i) participants were from a variety of
countries and legal backgrounds, but (2) tended to be men from
Europe and North America. There were, however, a few differences, notably: (i) the inclusion of arbitration practitioners who
might become arbitrators in the future but had no arbitrator appointments, and (2) and less diversity in the sample, particularly
with fewer civil law trained lawyers.
Puig's experiment explored appointment effects on decisions. Rather than focusing on the substantive law, however, he
focused on an area of wide discretion, and cost allocation in particular. In a scenario involving an ICSID arbitration concerning
an infrastructure project, a concession contract, and claims of expropriation under an investment treaty, both parties requested a
ioo% cost shift for both fees and tribunal expenses. Subjects were
told that counsel for both parties behaved professionally and ethically during the proceeding. The core variable Puig manipulated
was who appointed the arbitrators. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four groups: (i) appointment by the respondent,
(2) appointment by the claimant, (3) appointment by the parties,
and (4) no information about appointment (i.e. a "blind" appointment). A major finding was that, in the assessment of costs, appointment could influence outcomes. When arbitrators were told
the winning party appointed them to the case, for instance, those
arbitrators were more likely to have the losing party pay ioo% of
costs, as opposed to the losing party paying for only a portion of
costs. 73 Variations across other appointment conditions (including
72 Sergio Puig &Anton Strezhnev, "Affiliation Bias in Arbitration: An Experimental
Approach" (2017) 46:2 J Le Rev 371 (copy on file with author).
73 Ibid at 24-25. Puig's independent variables were: (1) appointment = four conditions [claimant, respondent, joint, and bind appointment a]; (2) investor devel-
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the blind appointment condition), however, failed to detect a reliable effect on cost decisions.
It is possible that those statistically significant results are confounded by something I discovered in my own research, where my data
showed me I was wrong about something and that Stephen Schill was correct: that, given the scope of discretion in costs despite having a uniform
legal standard to apply, there has been a reliable pattern whereby successful investors reliably had costs shifted in their favor, while successful
states did not. The core point from Puig's research, however, puts front
and center the possibility that there could be an "appointment effect" influencing outcomes on costs and other areas of where there is less legal
precision and more broad discretion.
I nevertheless believe that this provides a basis for a degree of
cautious optimism for international arbitration. For parties-be they individuals, private corporations, or states-who want more rule-of-law based
decisions, they can and should inject clearer rules and standards into both
the arbitral procedure and the applicable substantive law. If parties wish
to act in their capacity as principals to constrain the discretion of their
agents-in this case the arbitrators-they can and should act to do so.
But parties should nevertheless be mindful of the fact that arbitrators,
like other adjudicators, are human with the capacity for error. Principals
should design their dispute resolution systems 74 with a view towards creating safeguards to de-bias decision-making, incentivize principled decision-making, and (where they wish to outsource discretion) be prepared
for the consequences, be they pernicious or constructive.
IX. Conclusion
Thus, when we think about jurisdiction stripping and the proper
allocation of adjudicative authority, the data tells us that we should have
no illusions. Whether the elite decision-makers wear a suit or a robe, they
will be prone to making errors.
I am not the only one who has criticism for both judges and arbitrators. In October 2016, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge and
opment status = two conditions [high and medium]; (3) respondent development = two
conditions [middle and low]; and (4) outcome = four conditions [claimant wins, respondent
wins summarily, respondent wins on jurisdiction, respondent wins on merits]. Id. at 24-25.
This means there was a 4x2x2x4 design, or a sixty-four condition experiment creating a risk
of interaction effects that hides variance. Preliminary experimental studies typically manipulate one or two variables to eliminate risk of conflation and permit tracing of variance.
74 Susan D Franck, "Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design"
(2007) 92:1 Minn L Rev 161; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, "The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and Transitional Justice" (2009) 14 Harv Neg L Rev 289.
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prolific law and economics scholar Richard Posner made the following comment: "I think the [U.S.] Supreme Court is awful. I think it's reached a real
nadir. Probably only a couple of justices, Breyer and Ginsburg, are qualified.
They're okay, [but] they're not great."75 Even John Oliver's assessment of
elected judges in the United States demonstrates the variance that comes
from placing too much faith in national court judges.?6
Put simply: no one is perfect; not arbitrators, not judges, and certainly not law professors giving speeches, as I believe that I have more than
exhausted the time. The only way we can improve is by acknowledging our
flaws, finding ways to avoid error, and doing better at making informed
choices. I therefore propose that we abandon a paradigm of discourse where
we pillory adjudicators as devils or glorify them as angels. The truth is far
more nuanced.
Ultimately, I am asking for a turn in international arbitration toward a greater focus on evidence and data. The data may confirm some
things and may challenge other aspects of narratives that may feel ideologically soothing. I challenge us to move past ideological debates and try to
find common ground in vetted facts and fundamental values related to rule
of law. In this bizarre age-one I never thought to see in my lifetime-of deliberately disregarding facts in favor of emotionally appealing narratives, we
owe it to ourselves, our students, our clients, and our children to do more.
I encourage us all to stand our ground with facts and think of what 'truth
herself' would say to us.

75 David Lat, "Judge Richard Posner On SCOTUS: "The Supreme Court is Awful"", Above the

Law (24 October 2016), online: <abovethelaw.com/2016/lo/judge-richard-posner-on-scotusthe-supreme-court-is-awful/?rf=> citing C-SPAN, "Richard Posner" (4 October 2016), online:
<https://www.c-span.org/video/?415557-1/william-domnarski-discusses-richard-posner>
(comments around 17:00). Judge Posner made a later qualification. See David Lat, "Judge
Richard Posner Judge Richard Posner Corrects The Record Regarding His Supreme Court
Comments", Above the Law (28 October 2016), online: <abovethelaw.com/2016/1o/judgerichard-posner-corrects-the-record-regarding-his-supreme-court-comments/>
("The second
correction I'd like to see made has to do with my saying that none of the sitting Justices (plus
Scalia) is "qualified" for the Supreme Court except Ginsburg and Breyer. This could be misunderstood to mean that I think the others lack the necessary paper credentials, of which the most
important are graduating from a law school and passing the bar exam (though one of our greatest Justices, Robert Jackson, had just a year of law school, and did not graduate). That was not
my intention in using the word "qualified" (if I did use it). I meant good enough to be a Supreme
Court Justice. There are something like 1.2 million American lawyers, some of whom are extremely smart, fair minded, experienced, etc. I sometimes ask myself: whether the nine current
Supreme Court Justices (I'm restoring Scalia to life for this purpose) are the nine best-qualified
lawyers to be Justices. Obviously not. Are they nine of the best loo? Obviously not. Nine of the
best 1,ooo? I don't think so. Nine of the best io,ooo? I'll give them that.").
76 LastWeekTonight, "Elected Judges: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver" (25 February 2015),
online: YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poL71-Uk3l8>.

